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Education and the law 
 
Most sovereign states have enshrined the core content of the right to education in their 
constitutions and basic regulations, and there are numerous examples of courts applying 
domestic and international law to protect the right to education. Vagueness has also not 
prevented international development agencies from producing volumes of research on 
educational conditions.  
 
Historical neglect of the right to education cannot be attributed to methodological 
obstacles. The main obstacle to realizing the right to education remains a lack of political 
will and commitment on the part of states, international institutions and NGOs whose 
responsibility it is to respect, protect and promote these rights for the benefit of all human 
beings. The following list provides just a few examples of right to education violations that 
are already being tried in courts around the world: discrimination in access to education, 
banning teachers unions, failing to provide any primary level education, educational 
institutions in such poor condition that they are a risk to safety, unfair treatment of 
ideological, philosophical, religious or linguistic rights.... 
 







Currently, there is no way for individuals to bring forward violations of the right to 
education to international courts, except for regional courts, such as the European Court 
for Human Rights (ECtHR), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and national courts. 
 
However, governments have been meeting every year at the United Nations level to 
discuss monitoring reports, sometimes including individual complaints. NGO 
educational activists strongly support having an individual complaint mechanism 
available. 
 
Most countries have ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) or Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), both of which include the right 
to education. Petitions by NGOs can be effective in highlighting an issue and seeking 
remedy. 
 
At the domestic level, there are political and legal remedies for many educational 
violations. Although these remedies are still far from comprehensive, they do 
demonstrate that educational rights are fundamentally justiciable. For example, a core 
part of every international convention is a prohibition on discrimination. Anti-
discrimination laws exist in most countries, and are fully enforceable in a court of law. 
 
Support for the implementation of the right to education and freedom in education must 
be converted into a political reality and into a program of transformation of the 
educational system and the legal system that is understandable to a significant part of 
society. A joint search for a new strategy is needed, which will also rely on the efforts and 
accomplishments of individual organizations within civic society bold enough to 
undertake truly radical and forward-looking actions. 
 
Freedom of education – as a basic human right – is worldwide still one of the most 
prominent dimensions where the society is challenged to guarantee and refine 
fundamental choices for each citizen. 
 
Within any national society consensus should be reached on the predominant role of 
parental rights in education and on the contribution of civic society, and particularly of 
non-state schools, to the fulfillment of these rights. The international norm has to be 
appreciated as a guiding principle. 
 
The 2004 OSCE1 “Guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining to Religion or Belief”2 
on Religion and Education (including financing) stipulated that primary and secondary 
education is one of the most complicated areas pertaining to rights of religion or belief. 
Laws involving education should be reviewed to identify these and other issues raising 
concerns regarding international standards and OSCE commitments. 
 
The guidelines specified that among the most common (interrelated) issues, the following 







1. Parental rights related to education of their children. It is generally recognized that 
parents have the right to determine the religious education of their children. 
 
2. State financing of religious education (both within State and community schools 
and religious and other private schools). There is a wide variety of State practices 
regarding State financing of religious education both within State schools and 
private religious schools. The most obvious potential issue is whether the 
financing, when provided, is offered on a non-discriminatory basis. 
 
3. Religious, ethical, or humanist education in State and community schools. 
There is a wide variety of State practices regarding religious, ethical, and 
other forms of ideological education in State and community schools. When 
considered in conjunction with the rights of the parents, it is presumably the 
case that children cannot be required to take instruction in denominational or 
ideological education against their parents’ wishes, though general education 
about religions, beliefs, and ethics generally is permissible. 
 
4. State authorization of private religious or philosophical schools. (…) Parents 
should be able to educate their children in private religious schools or in 
other schools emphasizing ideological values. Certainly, the dominant practice 
among OSCE participating States is to allow for private religious and ideological 
schools, though the State is permitted to establish neutral criteria for the 
teaching of standard subjects such as mathematics, history, science, and 
languages. The State also permissibly may regulate teacher certification. 
 
5. Rules pertaining to hiring and firing teachers and other school personnel on 
grounds of religion or belief. Cases involving the hiring and firing of teachers and 
other school personnel at schools (both State and private) when religion or belief 
is a factor can be very complicated and fact-specific. Religious schools, for example, 
may require that employees must be members of the religion and may wish to 
terminate those who leave the religion or engage in conduct that officials deem 
to be contrary to the ethos of the school. There are many State practices in this 
regard, and it is a continually evolving area of the law.” 
 
But the ‘juridification’ and ‘judicialisation’ of the education system has pejorative 
overtones involving excessive recourse to legal procedure to resolve issues previously 
settled by negotiation or informal agreement or by the education institutions themselves. 
Here, however, juridification is to be understood as that part of the broader process of 
‘incorporation’ which brought the education institutions into the formal ambit of either 
administrative or constitutional law as the main instrument for regulating the boundaries 
of systems of governance whilst also giving formal legal recognition to powers and areas 
of responsibility previously defined internally by practice, tradition and custom within 
and by, the academic guild. 
 






due process - or its violation - could be ascertained. But, it also had the task of defining 
the boundaries within which autonomy could be exercised as well as defining the nature 
of that autonomy. The boundary between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ lives of the school 
were drawn in some countries with care but remains unclear in many cases, in keeping 
with the principle of the freedom to learn and to teach. 
 
A philosophy of ‘steering from a distance’ was introduced: a move towards a result- 
oriented, rather than rule-oriented responsibility for the institutions involved. 
Government’s role is changing.3 From the role of sole provider and detailed regulator with 
the responsible minister as the important actor, it has redefined its role to that of 
supervisor of a level playing field. 
 
The changing role of the government, the trend towards deregulation, a certain 
diversification of institutes, the gearing of national politics to the international context 
are the factors of change which affect education. The school has to deliver new answers 
on ‘if’, ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ education and research will be organized. 
 
On all legal dimensions of school life autonomy has been questioned. “Education is more 
closely audited, assessed and centrally controlled than at any time in history. This has 
formed an important part of the centralisation of power over the direction of education 
policy and the management of the system to meet various political and economic goals. 
The relationship between law and politics in the context of education reform is important 
to an understanding of the way that the politicisation of education during the past 30 
years has shaped its legal framework and the structure of control and regulation within 
the system.”4 
 
From the 1990s, the concept of autonomy was fiercely juxtaposed with the requirement 
for accountability. A range of external policies created new demands on education 
institutions which were regarded as leading to an erosion of autonomy. The international 
and transnational cooperation within the education landscape provoked some changes in 
the institutional behaviour. In a short period of time, government had intervened quite 
directly in education institutions both to guarantee quality management but also to 
require compliance with a new regime of education and funding regulations. This raised 
charges against government on the basis of infringing on institutional autonomy. 
 
In conclusion: it does not seem to be contradictory to state that the increasing delegation 
of powers to the institutional level is accompanied by an increasing power and number of 
norms of the central authority. States should guide the education sector through a 
framework of general rules, policy objectives, funding mechanisms and incentives for 
quality education, equal opportunity norms and standards.... In return for being freed 
from over-regulation and micro- management, schools should accept full institutional 
accountability to society at large for their results. 
 
It would appear that the call for a more transparent regulation of administrative 
relationships on the basis of the broadest possible concept of autonomy and flexibility for 






An experimental space for certain elements merits a legal foundation. The regulator, too, 
ought to permit himself some flexibility. New control tools might be considered and the 
‘contractualisation’ of (the organisation and provision of) school education has various 
precedents, including the introduction of instruments of private law and contract-like 
institutions/pupils, institutions/staff, institutions/State, intra-institutional relations and 
management contracts.5 Schools must be adequately equipped to function competitively 
in the transitional space between market and government. The economic dimension of 
education requires structural adjustments.6 
 
‘Deregulation’ does not stand in the way of ‘government control’. It does however require 
choices in relation to the limitations that government may set for itself and the obligations 
which it may impose on the institutions. After all, one of the most forceful arguments in 
current legislative doctrine is that evaluation of legislation as a tool for enhancing the 
quality of the law can no longer be ignored. It is a fundamental characteristic of 
democracy that it entails the possibility of self-correction, through an openness to debate, 
the revocability of decisions and the precarious nature of the positions of power. 
 
This applies all the more strongly during the phases of coordination, codification and 
modification. Even more relevant than Montesquieu’s claim that “one should not touch 
the law but with trembling hands” is the adage that any first rule of law must be written 
with huge circumspection. In education, it appears, ‘legality’ often overtakes ‘reality’. 
 
L’erreur sur le caractère dynamique du droit vient de la succession rapide des lois 
– On the Law on Education7 
 
Education policymakers identified also deregulation as an overall objective. Policies cope 
with the apparent contradiction between drafting framework law enabling institutions to 
implement autonomy and the differentiated systems of accountability In most countries 
there were criticisms of the role of the ministry and complaints about the unsupportive 
mix between too much and too hurried prescriptive  legislation. 
 
Complaints were also frequently voiced about either premature or unnecessary 
administrative overregulation which interfered with institutional autonomy. The 
expanding governmental and legal instrumentarium contradicts finding that the 
dependence of the public-funded system of education institutions on government grants 
has continued to be reduced with the development of a more market- oriented approach. 
 
In modern education, few major decisions are made without considering the legal 
consequences, and though the core functions of education are remarkably free from 
external legal influences, no one would plausibly deny the increase of legalization on 
schools or campus.8 
 
The Law on Education deals with practically all aspects of the school, with social rights 
with governance and management and the budget, with education as businesses, with 
property and estate issues and dispute management, and – chiefly – with staff and pupils. 






the law upon the school environment, including the application of the principles of 
consumer law to the pupil-school contract; the issue of the degree of affirmative 
action/positive discrimination over admissions, not only with reference to race/ethnicity; 
but also increasingly concerning socio-economic background; the exercise of expert 
school judgement in terms of probing whether the school really has delivered the content 
that the prospectus has promised; a greater emphasis on alternative and preventive 
dispute resolution in handling disputes with students and employees; … 
 
The education world tended to think of itself as removed from and perhaps above the 
world of law and lawyers. “(…) education (…) was often viewed as a unique enterprise 
that could regulate itself through reliance on tradition and consensual agreement. It 
operated best operating autonomously (…). An outsider would, almost by definition, be 
ignorant of the special arrangements and sensitivities underpinning this environment. 
And lawyers and judges as a group, at least in the early days, were clearly outsiders.”9 
 
But ‘justice and efficiency go hand in hand,’10  so long at least as the law does not impose 
excessive refinements. The national legislative reform of education should make use of 
the comparative set of legal indicators.11 
 
Common objectives and standards do not prevent education from continuing to be 
embedded in national traditions and based on specific cultural, social and confessional 
values, as well as on a diversity of social and economic policies. “It is fair to say that no 
other sector of law and administration reflects the traditions and culture of a people as 
much as does its provision for education.”12 
 
 
Freedom of and right to education as basic norms in 
democratic societies  
 
The legal framework for schooling, and especially for how educational freedom is 
ensured, generally provides an accurate reflection of a nation’s cultural traditions and 
social context. This is why education laws tend to differ from country to country in 
the same continent, and even more so from continent to continent. The institutional 
arrangements for education vary according to each country’s constitution. National 
and individual religious identities generally interweave: the historical, political and 
legal background of a given country will certainly influence the way in which it 
individual citizens express and perceive their religious identity. Promoting religious 
or philosophical identity in the education sector prominently encouraged the 
emergence of schools which seek to enforce a religious ethos.13 
 
Comparisons do nonetheless need to be made, and this is partly on account of the 
growing interest in the way educational rights and freedoms are becoming 
internationalised. 
 






define the basic educational rights and freedoms and decide which educational rights 
are enshrined in international standards of justice. 
 
Freedom of education has several aspects. The principle may therefore be described 
in different ways, dependent on the point of view from which a definition is made. 
 
From a negative point of view, freedom of education implies that a government does 
not have the right to establish any philosophical, ideological or religious theories nor 
to recognise any one of them as being the sole basis for an educational system. The 
government does not have a monopoly on education, nor may it use compulsory 
schooling to exercise a tyranny over the consciences of children and youth. 
 
In a case brought on behalf of Jehovah’s Witness pupils who were expelled or 
threatened with expulsion for refusing to join in the Pledge of Allegiance as a patriotic 
ceremony, decided in the midst of the Second World War, in 1943, the United States 
Supreme Court held that 
 
National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion is not in 
question. The problem is whether under our Constitution compulsion as here 
employed is a permissible means for its achievement. . . . As governmental 
pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more bitter as to 
whose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our people could 
proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what 
doctrines and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth 
to unite in embracing... freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not 
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its 
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing 
order. If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion (West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624). 
 
In his jurisprudence, namely the Case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pederson, the 
so called ‘Danish Sex Education’ case (Judgment 7 December 1976, Series A no. 23) 
and later in the Case of Campbell and Cosans on the infliction of corporal 
punishment (Judgment,25 February 1982, Series A, no. 48), the European Court on 
Human Rights stated that the State must respect the right of parents to ensure the 
right to education for their children in conformity with their own religious and 
philosophical convictions and thus that the State is forbidden to pursue an aim of 
indoctrination. ‘Education’ and ‘teaching’ were defined as follows: 
 
the whole process whereby, in any society, adults endeavour to transmit their 
beliefs, culture and other values to the young, whereas teaching or instruction 
refers in particular to the transmission of knowledge and to intellectual 







Looked at in this light, education is a typical example of a basic right, and it has two 
of the traditional features of this sort of right: first, there has to be freedom to enjoy 
the education of one’s choice and in this respect the rights of parents and pupils or 
students take precedence. 
 
Second, there has to be the possibility to choose what type of education to provide: in 
other words, any individual or body has the right to use an ideological or religious 
belief as a basis for providing education. 
 
It is clear that both aspects of “freedom of education” are closely linked. If parents 
had the right to choose any school but in fact government did not allow real 
alternatives to its own schools, the right would be meaningless. Or if everyone had 
the right to freely provide alternative schools but parents could not select among 
them, the right would be equally meaningless. 
 
Both are extreme cases, but we can see tendencies in both directions in a number of 
existing systems. For example, the various state governments in the United States 
generally allow non-state schools to operate with little oversight, and there is thus 
great variety among them, but the lack of public subsidies effectively excludes many 
pupils whose parents cannot afford to pay tuition. Educational freedom under those 
circumstances exists for the school but not for many parents who might seek to send 
their children to that school if they could afford the cost. In several other countries, 
as we will see, government subsidies makes it possible for low-income parents to 
make use of non-government schools, but government regulations limit the 
distinctiveness of the schools and thus the basis upon which educational freedom is 
exercised. 
 
From the point of view of sponsor or owner of a non-government school, a distinction 
can be made among freedom of establishment, freedom of orientation and freedom 
of organization -- that is, the freedom to define how the school will operate. 
 
The recent report by an international organization promoting educational freedom 
found that every country from which information was obtained, except Cuba and 
Vietnam, permitted non-state schools to operate, and thus met the first threshold of 
educational freedom. Among these countries that allowed non-state schools, 
however, there was considerable variation with respect to government support for the 
exercise of educational freedom, with 34 countries (counting the United Kingdom as 
three) providing substantial or complete financial support, and another 22 providing 
partial financial support.14 Countries promoting educational freedom are for the most 
part located in the region of Europe and North America. Greece and Ukraine are 
exceptions. Countries part of other regions such as Chile, Israel and, to a lesser extent, 
Filipinos, Argentina and Paraguay, are implementing policies that promote freedom 
of education.15 
 
The autonomy granted to religious groups seems more limited in ‘laic’ States than it 






between more strictly controlled non-state schools and other State aided private 




The international setting of educational rights 
 
Legislation is an indispensable instrument in accomplishing economic, social and 
political transformation.18 However, views differ on the appropriate methodology for 
drafting laws to facilitate those changes. 
 
Comparative law ought to be a vital part of the preparation of new legislation and the 
implementation or amendment of existing legislation. Young democracies, such as 
Russia and South Africa, have even guaranteed the supremacy of international law in 
their constitutions and have laid down an explicit constitutional obligation to use 
relevant comparative law as an instrument and touchstone when drafting laws or 
resolving legal disputes. 
 
All those concerned with education law and education policy realise very well that 
national sovereignty is not necessarily compromised by international indicators and 
benchmarks, nor by the relevance of comparative education law. The international 
dimension should clearly be seen as a genuine component of national education 
policy.19 
 
The same can also be said of the primacy of concern for quality in education. Research 
into and the organisation of systems to evaluate quality can hardly be set up as purely 
national undertakings nowadays. Every national administration and all applied 
research is based to an important degree on comparative educational science. 
 
This need not automatically lead to a single, uniform education system, like in the 
former Eastern Bloc. That would be contrary to the principle of mutual respect and 
democracy. The realisation of international benchmarks must always be reconcilable 
with the rule of subsidiarity within the international community. 
 
Comparative law can also involve a critical challenge and act as a spur where content 
is concerned for the legal specification of priorities for education policy. 
 
Comparability is thus a means of discovering where one’s own education policy is 
situated and possibly a source of inspiration for new law-making. The need for 
comparability and an international legal dimension to education, through 
standardisation, action programs and legal practice, is bound to increase in the 
future. 
 
Not a few changes in legislation are themselves a response to international trends. 






education has been undertaken by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development in its national reviews of education and the survey on International 
Indicators of Education Systems (INES), the databank “Eurydice” of the European 
Union, even on ‘private education’ (Eurydice, 2000), Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA), Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study 
(TIMSS), …. Governments routinely cite developments in the international arena as 
one of the main justifications for amending education legislation. That 
international developments are reflected in national legislation will doubtless 
strengthen the drive towards a greater international coherence in education 
systems, in its terminology and instrumentalities at a time when a greater degree 
of flexibility in the administrative and financial relationships between government 
and higher education figures high on the political agenda. 
 
A major focus of comparative education law lies on practical aims, such as the 
advancement of legislation, judicial decision-making and the harmonisation or 
even the unification of education law. In European Union perspective, the term 
‘coherency’ is also relevant, depending on the matters concerned. The ELA 
conferences and publications on Legal Status of Teachers, Legal Status of Minorities, 
Legal Status of Pupils drew attention to major differences in legal status among 
teachers, pupils and minorities in the various European countries and argued in 
favour of harmonisation of national regulations in the light of the principle of the free 
movement of workers.20 
 
Findings of comparative legal studies are also applied to the development of 
international law. As an aid to national legislation, comparative law has already 
established a considerable influence. 
 
Of course, the application of foreign solutions should be based on careful study of 
the historical, cultural, geographical and economic environment of a legal solution 
as well as existing legal regulations. The possibilities for incorporating foreign 
legislation into elementary, primary and secondary education are probably limited 
due to differences in culture, economics, and the structure of the legal code in 
different countries. Looking at actual developments in systems of education in 
Europe, however, the differences appear to be diminishing, since the national systems 
are faced with similar problems. 
 
Apart from using comparative law as a “reservoir of legal solutions,” from which the best 
may be chosen and adopted, comparative education law can make an effective 
contribution to general progress in public policy. Education legislation has strong 
instrumental aspects, because it serves certain policy goals. But if education law is 
regarded merely as an instrument of education policy, the comparison will focus 
on policy goals, and little or no attention will be paid to legal principles and values. A 
critical approach to comparative educational law will have to involve a critical 
reflection on policy as well as revealing any contradictions between law and reality. 
The function of law is to integrate the various pragmatic, ethical-political, moral and 








Worldwide, the concern exists that education is becoming more ‘legalized,’ but the 
interpretations of this phenomenon differ. A study in the United States found that 
“from 1909 to 1968, there were fewer suits by or on behalf of public school students 
challenging teacher, principal, and school board practices than in the years from 1969 
to 1978 [alone]. The percentage of cases decided in favor of students rose 
dramatically, from 19 percent (before 1969) to 48 percent (1969 to 
1978).”21 
 
Is this increasing recourse to legal answers to educational problems a positive or a 
negative phenomenon? Does the stress upon the legal context of education, the 
frequent litigation, the constant recourse to legislation to address matters which in 
the past would have been decided by educators, undermine the focus and 
effectiveness of schools, as some fear, or is it a necessary protection for the rights of 
pupils, parents, and school staff? The education law should be judged by the standard 
of its functionality for the development of individuals and the functioning of society. 
 
Several countries have transformed the legal right to education into a constitutional 
right and the courts are made responsible for arbitrating in disputes concerning, for 
example, the right of parents to a free choice of school, the right to a free choice 
between a religious or non-denominational education under the official educational 
system, the right to education free of charge up until school-leaving age, the right for 
pupils in compulsory education to receive moral or religious education with the costs 
being chargeable to government, the right to equal treatment for pupils and students, 
parents, members of the teaching staff and for schools. 
 
The European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights came into force on 1 
December 2009 does not lead to drastic changes in the delineation of mutual 
competences. 
 
This will inevitably raise the question whether the Member States with a more 
extensive catalogue of basic rights will not be exposed to pressure as soon as a 
‘European Constitution’ is drafted. Although the right to education “is calling by its 
very nature for regulation by the State, regulation which may vary in time and place 
according to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals” -- 
according to the European Court on Human Rights (Case ‘relating to certain aspects 
of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium’, Judgment 23 July 1968, 
Series A no. 6) -- the conformity of national law to international law will have to be 
carefully checked in the future. As an Austrian scholar argued extensively, the right 










The role of the State in promoting human rights in education 
 
International legal standards remind us that human rights are universal, 
individual, interdependent, and interrelated. According to the “Vienna Declaration” 
and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights: “the 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal 
manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance 
of national and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, 
regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 
 
The right to education and to educational freedom is clearly a cross-sectoral right, 
simultaneously civil, political, economic, social and cultural. They are interlinked with 
the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, association and belong also to the group 
of solidarity rights. The European Court of Human Rights reiterated that in the area 
of education and teaching art. 2 of Protocol No.1 is in principle the ‘lexspecialis’ in 
relation to other fundamental rights (Case of Folgerø and Others v. Norway, Judgment 
29 June 2007; Case of Lautsi and Others v. Italy, Judgment of 18 March 2011). 
 
Jurisprudence emphasized that freedom of education should be interpreted in the 
light of the right to privacy and freedom to receive information. The UNESCO 
Convention against Discrimination in Education, the European legal non-
discrimination framework and recently the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ECOSOC) refined the application of the non-discrimination principle 
in the education sector (General Comment No. 20, 2 July 2009). 
 
About 40 documents produced by the United Nations and regional and 
international institutions deal with education rights.23 Recent texts stipulate that 
“States are duty bound . . . to ensure that education is aimed at strengthening the 
respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, they call for human rights to 
be included in the curricula of learning instructions”. The international community 
“considers human rights education, training and public information essential . . . for 
fostering mutual understanding, tolerance and peace.” 
 
Most legal doctrine and the concept of the right to education stress the links between this 
right, the development of a personality and of the social community and the enjoyment 
of human rights. 
 
Among most authors there is a general agreement that education: (a) allows man freely 
to develop his personality and dignity; (b) allows his active participation in social life in a 
spirit of tolerance; (c) respects parents, national values and concern for environment; and 
(d) contributes to the development of human rights. 
 
The ultimate basis of the right to education as embodied in the various national and 






inherent in every human being and hence to the development of the human personality. 
 
It is perhaps pertinent to bear in mind that these rights belong to the human being as an 
individual and that the so called “collective” rights are qualified as “functional” rights. 
 
Education is a pre-condition for the full enjoyment of a variety of human rights. The 
literature distinguishes three obligations of the State related to human rights: “to respect”, 
“to protect” and “to fulfil”. “The first level is the ‘obligation to respect’. This obligation 
prohibits the State itself to act in contravention of recognized rights and freedoms. This 
means that the State must refrain from interfering with or constraining the exercise of 
such rights and freedoms. The second level is the ‘obligation to protect’. This requires the 
State to take steps - through legislation or by other means - to prevent and prohibit the 
violation of individual rights and freedoms by third persons. The third level concerns the 
‘obligation to fulfill’. This obligation can be characterised as a program obligation and 
implies more of a long-term view.”24 
 
All these distinctions illustrate the quite original nature of the rights to and in education 
and their link to the consideration of human rights education. It is therefore worth trying 
to identify the role of human rights education within the context of the right to education 
in general and to show how a real human rights culture can be built up maintaining 
continuity with specific cultural and religious traditions: 
 
Education in human rights and the right to education should not be studied 
separately, since education in human rights is part of the purpose of education 
recognized by international instruments (...) A distinction has to be drawn 
between education in human rights, law, religion and civic ethics, a part of social 
ethics, which, in turn, should not be separated from ethical training as a whole.25 
 
The Education and Religion Recommendation of the Council of Europe, (4 October 
2004) stipulated that “the family has a paramount role in the upbringing of children, 
including in the choice of a religious upbringing. However, knowledge of religions is 
dying out in many families. More and more young people lack the necessary bearings 
fully to apprehend the societies in which they live and others with which they are 
confronted” (§3); “Governments should also do more to guarantee freedom of conscience 
and of religious expression, to foster education on religions, to encourage dialogue with 
and between religions and to promote the cultural and social expression of religions” 
(§6). 
 
International experience confirms that there is an overall urgent need to introduce human 
rights education, as a responsibility shared by governments and educational institutions. 
The effort to implement it universally, in order to ensure that an understanding of the 
nature of human rights is widely distributed, implies reconsidering in some respects the 
objectives of education and culture. 
 
Partnerships and consultations among the different actors (including international 






unions, specific professional bodies such as lawyers, the police, etc.) are essential to 
ensure that implementation is effective, that the approach is democratic and that ideas 
are turned into action. 
 
In 2010, all the Member States of the EU adopted the Council of Europe’s Charter on 
Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education. National curricula 
and/or education regulations may encourage the whole school to adopt attitudes and 
values that emphasise the principle of democracy. However, recent research pointed out 
that this is the case in only a third of European countries, whether or not in direct 
connection with citizenship education.26 All European countries, except Cyprus, Sweden 
and Turkey, have introduced central regulations and official recommendations to allow 




The contribution of international norms 
 
From the standards of international law concerning the right to education can be 
deduced a miscellany of guarantees of freedom and socio-economic-cultural rights 
on the part of parents and pupils or students on the one hand, and general aims for 
and obligations of the government on the other. 
 
According to the international declarations and treaties concerned with human 
rights, the tasks of the government are more detailed and the principle of non-
discrimination explicitly defined. Depending on both the legal definition in the 
international treaty, and on the legal culture which nationally tolerates or encourages 
the enforceability of the international norm, these governmental tasks must be 
regarded as prescriptions for programs or as positive legal obligations, sanctionable 
by the courts. 
 
In several countries the direct effect of international standards concerning education 
is accepted, albeit reluctantly, although this legal capacity (iuscogens) cannot be 
ascribed to all conditions without exception. Nevertheless, by the application of 
international standards on education, which oblige States to take ‘suitable measures’ 
within national legislation and the existing legal order, mention is made of their 
relevance as guidelines or as an “international minimum.” 
 
If the jus cogens of the international standard is taken seriously, it would appear that 
the test of international law, in respect of the right to education, should be seen as a 
formal part of the legislative process. As the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights has pointed out, the obligation to ‘fulfil’ consists in setting up the 
appropriate legislative, administrative, judicial “and other measures”. 
 
The effectiveness of the international norm depends on its applicability and on its 






compatibility issues between the national and the international legal education norm. 
Global legal standards could be attained. 
 
One of these standards might be the so-called ‘standstillobligation’, which relates to 
secondary and highereducation. It has been refined by some Constitutional Courts. 
Article 13 and 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights oppose measures that are contrary to the objective of free education, despite 
the precarious economic and budgetary situations. 
 
Over the years, the ‘Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ and the 
‘Committee on the Rights of the Child’ have reported for example, that there is an 
apparent ‘lack of action’ in El Salvador to remedy child labour; that the government 
in Congo has abolished free education; that the educational situation has regressed 
in Kenya, Haiti, Mexico and Mali; that the Japanese Government has introduced fees 
in public education, shifting the high cost of private education; that the budget of 
Guinea is clearly inadequate to deal with the serious shortage of teachers. And they 
have called upon the Government of Jamaica to provide adequate safety nets for 
vulnerable and poor children.... 
 
From a comparative perspective it is also highly problematic that in several countries 
there is limited or no opportunity for education of one’s own choice: either there is 
only State-controlled education, or in a mixed system, private education is too 
expensive for parents.28 
 
The General Comment No. 13, 1999 of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ECOSOC) proclaimed that given the principles of non- 
discrimination, equal opportunity and effective participation in society for all, the 
State has an obligation to ensure that the liberty set out in art. 13 (4) ICESCR does not 
lead to extreme disparities of educational opportunity for some groups in society (§ 
30). 
 
The international educational rights apply in all situations, however tight State 
finance may be. Official reports have focused on the unwillingness of governments to 
redress discriminations, worldwide. But reports also mention that progress has 
been made in India; that its legal framework on elementary education as a 
sanctionable human right has been improved. In short, there have also been 
positive experiences on all continents. 
 
Here it is assumed from the outset that the government ought to watch over the 
effective application of the right to education, in its various definitions, and that such 
is of overriding importance for the democratic quality of society. In this respect too 
an absolutely priority character is attached to the right to education in conformity 
with the nature of the right. Also valid as a corollary to the right to education is the 
existence and the maintenance of a minimum of education provided by the State, 
otherwise (as noted above) that right would be illusory, chiefly for those who have 







Obviously, on the international level, there is no uniform rule on how educational 
rights should be protected and enjoyed; there are too many differences among 
nations and their social and legal arrangements. Even less is it possible to 
prescribe any specific kind of education or educational level postulated, although 
elementary education must be assumed to be the absolute minimum. 
 
A remark about the South African Constitution: it might be expected that a ‘new 
democracy’ would appeal to international legal standards more frequently than is 
the case in constitutional democracies which already dispose of a proven or refined 
jurisprudence in educational matters. On this point too South Africa can teach 
something to the ‘old’ democracies, since these give a rather limited interpretation 
and scope to international norms and only scanty acceptance to the self-executing 
character of treaty conditions. The first pronouncements of the Constitutional Court -
- cases CCT 39/95 of 4th April l996 and CCT 46/95 of 3rd April l996 -- and the 
Supreme Court of South Africa - case no. 2436/96 of l6th February 1996 offer a clear 
reflection of the integration of the international legal standards and the relevance of 
comparative law. 
 
Section 39 (1) reads as follows: ‘The court, tribunal or forum must consider international 
law; the judge may consider foreign law’… 
 
According to  Article  13  (3)  International  Covenant  on  Economic, Social  and Cultural 
Rights, State parties undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents to choose other 
than public schools for their children and to ensure their religious and moral education. 
The same obligation is encountered in other international instruments, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 18 (4)), the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Article 2 of the First Protocol) and the UNESCO 
Convention against Discrimination in Education (Article 51 (b)). 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union guarantees a right to 
education in Chapter 2 (Article 14). It states that: 
 
• everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and 
continuing training (para. 1), that 
 
• this right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory education (para. 2), 
and that 
 
• the freedom to found educational establishments with due respect for democratic 
principles and the right of parents to ensure the education and teaching of their 
children in conformity with their religious, philosophical and pedagogical 
convictions shall be respected, in accordance with the national laws governing 
the exercise of such freedom and right (para. 3). 
 






terms. Taken literally, it is a right to have access to education, which easily might imply 
positive obligations on the European Union and the Member States, when they are 
implementing Union Law (Article 51). Article 14 thus embraces a right of the individual 
to receive an education and this right can be read as imposing a duty to establish publicly-
supported educational institutions, if such institutions do not exist. If the right to 
education is to be effective, its exercise requires by implication the existence and 
maintenance of a minimum of education provided or supported by the state. Otherwise 
that right would be illusory, in particular for those who have insufficient means. 
 
Not only the philosophical roots of the right to education but legal comparisons 
demonstrate quite definitely that this right has something to do with the notion of 
freedom. In this tradition, education is intended to enable a human being to freely develop 
his or her personality and human dignity. This implies freedom of choice between 
different kinds of education or schools, on the basis of religious, philosophical, or 
pedagogical convictions or for reasons of language or ethnic affiliation. It implies also 
freedom from indoctrination in educational institutions and demands respect for the 
personality and human rights of the learner, who has to be protected also against 
misguided forms of educational influence of whatever kind. It might also include the 
freedom of home instruction. Such an interpretation brings a dimension of individual 
freedom to light, which must be protected against state infringements.  
 
Based on this interpretation we have to consider the right to education not merely as a 
social right to receive education and of equal access to educational institutions provided 
by the State. It is also a freedom protecting against any infringement in the human 
personality, which might occur in the process of education. 
 
According to the Charter, the freedom to found private schools is limited by respect for 
democratic principles and must be exercised in accordance with the arrangements 
defined by national legislation. The evocation of democratic principles will exclude 
certain types of private school, for instance schools, which intend to discriminate against 
certain pupils on the basis of their race, or which exercise school discipline in a way that 
is not compatible with respect for human rights. 
 
The founding of private educational institutions is subject to national legislation, as 
mentioned in Paragraph 3. This is a reminder that the necessity to regulate many aspects 
of education is also an aspect of the realization of the right of education. 
 
What might seem startling in connection with the right to found private schools is the 
somewhat strange reason given for this freedom. According to the explanatory notes, the 
freedom to found private schools is one of the aspects of freedom to conduct a business. 
However, a pure economic approach runs short, should it be its main or sole justification. 
Such an approach would neglect the dominant aspect of pedagogical, religious or ethnic 
choice that motivates the maintenance of private educational institutions in most cases. 
Any interpretation of the right to found private schools based on a purely economic 








In conclusion: the right to education is intrinsically linked to free choice of education 
without interference from the State or a third party, particularly, but not exclusively in 
terms of the family’s religious or philosophical convictions. This element is violated 
according to international law if a State fails to respect the free choice of parents with 
regard to the religious instruction of their children. This means not only, in practice, that 
a State must ensure an objective and pluralist curriculum and avoid indoctrinating 
students within ‘public’30 education. According to the Western approach, States should 
be reluctant to the promotion of philosophical ‘concepts of life’, which to some extent 
seems not in contradiction with art. 17(3) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights, which states that the promotion and protection of morals and traditional values 
recognized by the community should be the duty of the State. 
 
In this respect, the ECtHR Grand Chambre Judgment of 18 March 2011 in the Case of 
Lautsi and others v. Italy seems to be quite relevant, although focusing on state schools 
but with a broader impact on State obligations. The government explained in casu that 
the presence of crucifixes in state-school classrooms, being the result of Italy’s historical 
development, is considered as a fact which gave it not only a religious connotation but 
also an identity-linked one, now corresponded to a tradition which they considered it 
important to perpetuate. The judgment added that, beyond its religious meaning, the 
crucifix symbolised the principles and values which formed the foundation of democracy 
and western civilisation, and that its presence in classrooms was justifiable on that 
account. 
 
The Court took ultimately the view that the decision whether or not to perpetuate a 
tradition fails in principle within the discretion or ‘margin of appreciation’ of the 
respondent State. The Court must moreover take into account the fact that Europe is 
marked by a great diversity between the States of which it is composed, particularly in the 
sphere of cultural and historical development. It emphasises, however, that the reference 
to a tradition cannot relieve a contracting State of its obligation to respect the rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the Convention ant its Protocols. “Moreover, the fact that there is 
no European consensus on the question of the presence of religious symbols in State 
schools (…) speaks in favour of that approach” (§ 67-70). 
 
In previous cases the Court explained that in view of the place occupied by Christianity in 
the history and tradition of Norway, the question of a syllabus dealing with religion and 
philosophy has to be regarded as falling within the margin of appreciation left to it in 
planning and setting the curriculum (see Folgerø case, cited above § 89) and it reached a 
similar conclusion in the context of “religious culture and ethics” classes in Turkish 
schools, where the syllabus gave greater prominence to knowledge of Islam on the ground 
that, notwithstanding the State’s secular nature, Islam was the majority religion practised 
in Turkey (see Judgment 9 October 2007 in Case of Hassan and EylemZengin v. Turkey, 








Freedom of education versus preventive measures 
 
The principle of freedom of education includes the rejection of preventive measures or 
preliminary permissions that prevent or unduly hinder the establishment of schools. In 
history, many examples could be mentioned of limitations upon the provision of non-
state schools, including those adopted by the totalitarian States and Cuba and Vietnam 
do not allow such schools at present.31 
 
These are extreme cases, of course, and none of the countries included in our study forbid 
non-state schools. On the other hand, the long hesitation in several members of the EU 
about whether to allow Islamic schools reminds us of an earlier episode in the United 
States, when anxiety about Catholic immigrants led the voters of Oregon to approve a 
measure that required all children to attend public schools until completion of the eighth 
grade. This repressive measure was the occasion for an important decision by the United 
States Supreme Court striking it down on constitutional grounds. The Court ruled, in 
1925, that 
 
the fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose 
excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them 
to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature 
of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 
 
The Court, it should be noted, also stressed 
 
the power of the state reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise, and 
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age 
attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic 
disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be 
taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public 
welfare (Pierce v. Society of Sisters (268 U.S. 510). 
 
“Reasonably” is the key word here, and each state has had to work out its own balance 
between intrusiveness and respect for the autonomy of schools which it does not operate 
or (except in limited and indirect fashion) support. Must nonpublic school teachers be 
state-certified? How can government ensure that nonpublic schools are academically 
equivalent to public schools? Should the state somehow intervene if a nonpublic school is 
teaching racist doctrines? 
 
In most cases, the regulatory impact of government on nonpublic schools in the United 
States has been quite limited. In this and other countries, however, educational freedom 
requires that the administrative practice regarding the registration of independent 
schools not cause direct or indirect obstacles to the effective implementation of the 
freedom of education, as is sometimes the case in young democracies. It is no accident 






establishment of and access to private schools outside the public school system falls under 
the provision of the ECHR. 
 
The travauxpréparatoires indisputably demonstrate (...) the importance attached 
by many members of the Consultative Assembly and a number of governments to 
freedom of teaching, that is to say, freedom to establish private schools (Judgment 
of 7 December 1976, A. 23) 
 
In a more positive vein, the process established for approval of non-state schools can 
be set up and administered in a way which either hampers of promotes diversity in 
the system, as the example of Poland makes very evident. The 1950 “modus vivendi” 
agreement between the new Communist government and Cardinal Wyszyski 
provided that “schools run by the Church will be able to enjoy the rights of state 
schools on the general principles prescribed by appropriate laws and regulations 
issued by the education authorities,”32 but only ten Catholic secondary schools (eight 
of them boarding schools for girls run by religious orders) were able to maintain their 
existence. The Polish Constitution adopted in 1952 did not guarantee educational 
freedom; regulations adopted by the Ministry on February 26, l965 made provision 
for approval of schools outside the state system, but the Ministry’s officials made this 
exceptionally difficult. Only recognized local organizations that professed socialist 
ideology were considered eligible.33 
 
In June 1988, while the non-socialist Civic Educational Association was trying to 
negotiate a way through the approval process so that it could sponsor non- state 
schools, an individual, Anna Jezioma of Kraków, petitioned the Ministry for 
permission to open an independent elementary school. The petition was refused, but 
she appealed the decision to the High Administrative Court with the support of a 
number of organizations including the CEA. On February 24, 1989 her right to open 
an independent school was sustained by the Court; the ice was beginning to break 
up.34 
 
With the radical political changes that took place later that year, the Ministry 
established, on August 25, 1989 new provisions for subsidizing from the state budget 
educational programs run by the Catholic Church. The new team, members of 
Solidarity, that came to the Ministry of Education in late 1989 resolved to use the 
existing provision for approval of non-state schools as a means of responding to the 
growing parent-initiated demand and stimulating new initiatives by teachers. They 
gave broad publicity to their willingness to approve applications without endless 
bureaucratic hassles. Response was overwhelming. “Between April and July l990, 2 
or 3 non-state schools appeared every day in various parts of the country.”35 
 
As the Polish example illustrates, formal legal provisions may be interpreted and 
applied in ways which promote educational freedom and diversity, or which hamper 
it. The Russian education law, for example, shows quite clearly how prohibitive 







Non-state schools must accept quality control and some form of core curriculum, in 
return for recognition of diplomas and funding. This could nevertheless lead to the 
decrease of education freedom and even some loss of their specific mission. Their 
distinctiveness, their ‘zone d’autonomie’, could be at stake. These following legislative 
criteria are inspired by international conventions (f.eg. art. 13, section 3 of the 
previously mentioned ICESCR): 
 
• The lawmaker must restrict himself to minimal standards, respecting the 
specific mission of the school. These standards should be relevant and 
proportionally detailed with respect to the goal envisaged. 
• It must leave enough room for alternatives for realising the same goals. 
• Thirdly, legislation can only be designed after broad consultation of all 
recognised forms of education and stakeholders. 
• Finally, full autonomy must be guaranteed in terms of didactic aspects and 
pedagogical approach. 
 
If these conditions are not met, which unfortunately is often the case (f.eg. imposing 
a timetable), you could but conclude that the State-standards themselves undermine 
essential aspects of freedom of education. 
 
Education is expected to be more the expression of a local democracy than a uniform 
interpretation of national identity. The legislative approach I propose will also be 
beneficial to non-state schools. An OECD report states that “Experience has shown 
that the most decentralised systems are also the most flexible, the quickest to adapt 
and have the greatest propensity to develop new forms of social partnership”.37 
 
 
Freedom of education versus indoctrination 
 
Freedom of education requires that all forms of indoctrination by the authorities be 
resisted. This is always a danger, because governments are tempted to see schooling as a 
useful instrument for promoting their policies.38 As Wilhelm von Humboldt warned in 
1791, before he became a Prussian education official, 
 
national education -- or that which is organized or enforced by the State--is at least 
in many respects very questionable. .The grand, leading principle, towards which 
every argument hitherto unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute 
and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity; but 
national education, since at least it presupposes the selection and appointment of 
some particular instructor, must always promote a definite form of development, 
however careful to avoid such an error. And hence it is attended with all those 
disadvantages which, as we have already seen, flow from such a positive policy; 
and I need only add that every restriction becomes more directly fatal when it 
operates on the moral part of our nature-that if there is one thing more than 






is precisely education, whose object it is to develop the individual.... The freest 
development of human nature, directed as little as possible to citizenship, 
should always be regarded as of paramount importance. He who has been thus 
freely developed should then attach himself to the State; and the State should 
test itself by his measure. . . all systems of national education, governed as they 
are by the spirit of regulation, impose on nature a special civic form.39 
 
Similarly, John Stuart Mill insisted, in 1859, that 
 
All that has been said of the importance of individuality of character, and 
diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as of the same 
unspeakable importance, diversity of education. A general State education is a 
mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another; and as 
the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power 
in the government . . . in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it 
establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over 
the body.”40 
 
The obligation “to respect” Art. 2 of the First Protocol of ECHR should be interpreted 
in a positive sense; it requires a positive, tolerant attitude from the State toward the 
religious or philosophical convictions of parents. The verb ‘respect’ means more than 
‘acknowledge’ or ‘take into account’: in addition to a primarily negative undertaking, 
it implies some positive obligation on the part of the State (ECtHRJudgment 29 June 
2007, Folgerø Case, cited above, § 84 (c)). International law not only prohibits the 
State from preventing parents from opting for the education of their children outside 
the public schools, but also requires the State actively to respect parental convictions 
within the public schools. This requirement is then obviously not met simply by the 
availability of private schools or alternative means of education other than the public 
schools.41 
 
In the same Judgment 29 June 2007, Folgerø Case, the Court stipulated that 
although according to the government, it would have been possible for the applicant 
parents to seek alternative education for their children in private schools, which were 
heavily subsidised by the State, as it funded 85% of all expenditure connected to the 
establishing and running of private schools, the existence of such a possibility could 
not dispense the State from its obligation to safeguard pluralism in state-schools 
(§101). 
 
It is submitted that the term “to respect” in Article 13(3) of the ICESCR has a similar 
meaning. The character of the obligation “to respect” is such that it ensures a domain 
that is free from State interference.42 This type of obligation fits in well with 
obligations relating to the implementation of civil and political right, such as the right 
to privacy and the right to family life. No further measures of implementation are 








The democratic principle asserted by the constitutions of most democracies and the 
basis for freedom of education is founded on the confidence that most persons will 
make use of their rights responsibly, while at the same time respecting other persons’ 
rights and liberties. Unfortunately, policymakers are always tempted to see schooling 
as a useful instrument for some social or political purpose, often with the best of 
intentions but almost inevitably in conflict with the freedom of parents and of 
teachers and sponsors of non-state schools. In the words of a French constitutionalist, 
“the question of freedom of education remains always open. It is a natural tendency 
of the governors of the State, whoever they may be, to endure the freedom of others 
impatiently.”44 
 
The approach to freedom of the democratic State which was laid down in Western 
constitutions during the 19th century is in no way libertarian but expressive of the 
legal relation between public authorities and citizens. The public authorities, whose 
power is founded on the people, may not exert that power in areas where citizens 
individually determine their attitude with regard to the powers that be; if this were 
not so, the State would be able to manipulate its citizens in order to perpetuate its 
existence. The areas involved are especially those that are concerned with spiritual 
freedom: conscience, religion, speech, press, association... and education. 
 
The principle of freedom of choice means thus that no pressure may be exerted in 
any way with the aim to influence that choice in order to favor a specific type of 
education. Various national legal stipulations confirm explicitly that parents are free 
to send their children to the school of their choice and that they should not be forced 
in any way to let their children attend a school which is not of their own choosing. But 
is it enough to allow parents to choose, if government restrictions make the sort of 




Right to education linked with freedom of education 
 
Freedom of education has acquired a new meaning as a result of a change in the 
perception of the role of the State. 
 
The Liberal State has given way to the “Welfare State,” gaining a social dimension. As 
a result, the traditional freedoms have been supplemented by so-called basic social 
rights. If the traditional rights and freedoms are regarded as being the result of ideas 
developed during the 18th and early 19th century, then social rights must be looked 
upon as the fruit of the social, cultural, and economic developments of this century. 
These rights and freedoms emerged, gained recognition and were carried to fruition 
in reaction to much abuse of power by governments. They owe their origins in a 
reluctance to trust the State, which was regarded as representing the greatest danger 







In contrast, social rights have been also developed in reaction to abuses of power by 
private organizations and–more importantly–by a breakdown of many of the civil 
society institutions which have traditionally met most human needs. Social rights are 
based on trust in the State, which was granted the power to intervene in virtually all 
dimensions of social life in an unprecedented manner. 
 
Associated with this shift in thinking is the concept that citizens have a right to make 
claims upon the State for all manner of services. While governments have sponsored 
and funded schooling for many decades in most Western nations, it is possible to 
detect a shift in assumptions toward a concept of entitlement. The right to an 
education has come to count as a basic social right, as we can see particularly clearly 
in the case of children with extreme physical or mental handicaps who at present are 
entitled to extremely expensive care and treatment by educational systems which, a 
generation ago, would have disclaimed any responsibility for them. 
 
In order for each citizen to be able to enjoy real freedom in both the social and 
economic spheres, the State has to be able to guarantee that everyone can make use 
of the right to what the constitutions of some American states refer to as a “free and 
appropriate” education. 
 
The right to such an education may be interpreted as an objective that has to be 
attained in order to achieve positive freedom, and this objective legitimizes 
government intervention without which freedom would be devoid of content for 
many individuals. 
 
The fact is, freedom of education appears to be no more than a theoretical principle, 
if the freedom is not transformed into an effective social or cultural right and is not 
incorporated conclusively in national and international educational laws. Social 
rights do not seek freedom from but freedom through government intervention. 
 
Governments need to intervene by providing a framework in which the freedom of 
and the right to education are genuinely possible. The right to and freedom of 
education relate to each other in this respect as complementary principles. 
 
Compulsory education, imposed by the law, cannot be avoided in a genuine 
democracy . . . though it should not be confused with compulsory schooling, much 
less compulsory attendance in a state school. Modern “freedom of education” -- and 
this refers to the first, somewhat forgotten or implicit interpretation of the term -- 
aims to act as a ‘guardian’of democracy, by guaranteeing that each citizen will 
receive adequate education, so that all citizens can make proper use of their 
democratic rights and liberties and lead independent and productive lives to the 
fullest extent of their capacities. 
 
The right to education is not only a matter of access but also of content. Article 2945 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child adds a qualitative dimension to article 






between the global and the local, the individual and the collective, tradition and 
modernity, competition and equal chances, etc.46 Article 29 (1) stipulates that 
education should promote a broad range of values that go beyond the boundaries of 
religion, nation and culture. At first glance, this objective may lead to conflict, e.g. in 
the case of the promotion of the child’s own cultural identity, between the language 
and the values from which it hails on the one hand and the national values of the 
country in which the child lives and other civilisations on the other. The significance 
of this stipulation lies in its emphasis on the need for a balanced approach to values 
within education and the promotion of dialogue and respect for others. Children do 
not lose their rights when they walk through the school gate. Their rights must be 
guaranteed in the educational process, the pedagogical method, the environment in 
which education is provided. 
 
Children must be allowed to express their opinions freely in accordance with article 
12 (1) and to participate in a school life that respects the child’s dignity. According to 
article 2, any form of discrimination, be it overt or covert, is in violation of the dignity 
of the child. Denying access to education is primarily in contravention of article 28, 
while there are numerous ways in which article 29 (1) is violated, with similar effect.47 
 
Unlike the ECHR, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child and the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have expressed 
their concern about the imposition of any ban on the wearing of the headscarf at 
schools. 
 
The active exercise of education freedom guarantees religious and ideological 
pluralism, - a cornerstone of democratic society. It would appear that, in various 
countries, precisely these values are under threat, while freedom of religious 
conviction remains a condition for a societal consensus. 
 
In herdissenting opinion (ECtHR, Judgment 10 November 2005, Case Leyla Sahin 
v. Turkey) Justice Françoise Tulkensobserved: “… toutes ces interdictions avaient 




Relevancy of the non-state sector 
 
Why is freedom of education sometimes referred to as “the least loved of all forms of 
expression,” as the French author Jean Rivero put it “La liberté la moinsaimée au 
monde”? 
 
According to comparative constitutional law, freedom of education is always at stake in 
the transition from a non-democratic state to democracy. This was the case when the 
Western democracies emerged in the 19th century. The first presidential decree after the 






deadlocks in the negotiations on the new South African Constitution; thankfully they 
were resolved. 
 
The legal status of minorities could be mostly screened from their education rights.48 
European jurisprudence focused in this respect as follows on conflict between groups 
within a nation: “Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to 
those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must 
always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment 
of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position” (Judgment 
 
18 December 1996, Case of Valsamis v. Greece, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 
1996-VI, § 27; Case of Folgerø, cited above, § 27). 
 
In 1994, Albania did not allow non-state schools for minorities; in Serbia and 
Montenegro, schools teaching in other languages than Serbian were banned. No non-state 
schools were allowed in Iran after 1979. Vietnam and Cuba prohibit them. The most 
frequent educational request from CIS-countries to the European Union after their 
independence concerned expertise in education legislation and the breaking of school 
monopolies, including the establishment of alternative publishing firms for schoolbooks. 
The third generation of education laws should be screened. This seems not the prior 
concern of international legal agencies (“while avoiding any evaluation of the 
legislation’s expediency”, ECtHR Judgment 4 December 2008, Case Dogru v. France, § 
63; Zengin Case, § 53), but should be organised by NGO’s and comparative law research 
experts. 
 
Education is a sphere of life that relates to the formation of values and worldviews. To 
define the appropriate position of the State vis-à-vis non-state educational initiatives 
remains a pertinent issue, in all countries, both past and present. The late Father Arrupe, 
the former General of the Jesuit Order, once said that the dictatorial regimes of Latin 
America tried to achieve in just a few decades what had not been achieved for centuries: 
to stifle the cry for freedom in society by closing down non-state schools. 
 
After all, the efforts to create the “new Soviet man” through schooling were also justified 
in the name of democracy, social justice, peace, and other worthy goals, but they were a 
fundamental denial of the human dignity that depends upon freedom of mind as well as 
of body. 
 
This question defines a sphere of recurrent political conflict in many countries. 
 
Freedom, in turn, remains an empty principle unless it is given institutional expression. 
Without pluralism, free choice of education – a core content of the right to education – is 
meaningless. Alexis de Tocqueville, writing on Democracy in America, asserted that “… 
without local institutions a nation may give itself a free government, but it has not got 
the spirit of liberty;” and he added the following rhetorical question: “How can liberty be 








Elsewhere De Tocqueville claimed that “…among the laws that rule human societies, 
there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to 
remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve 
in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased”. 
 
A living democracy is characterised by commitment on the part of civilians, by an 
impressive array of organising bodies, stakeholders, and volunteers within civic society. 
People sustain policy. They are co-responsible for the public interest. To some extent, 
international rules do recognise this sector as an official partner within human rights 
organisations. But in some countries, the legal framework is still lacking. 
 
The UNESCO planning unit recognises that precisely the non-state sector makes a 
tangible contribution to the realisation of the right to education in a number of African 
countries. 
Article 7 of the World Declaration on Education for All says that providing basic 
education for all is the unique obligation of national, regional and local authorities. But it 
immediately adds that the authorities cannot be expected to carry out that obligation 
alone. This requires partnerships with families, religious groups, local communities and 
NGOs. 
 
There is a further dimension to the issue. 
 
One reason why educational freedom is not an ‘obvious’ freedom -- unlike the other 
fundamental rights – is that most non-state schools are faith-based or connected with a 
religious organisation. They are, to a large extent, rooted in a specific tradition, as are 
many hospitals, childcare institutions and homes for the elderly. 
 
A diversity of schools is a logical response to the diversity in terms of culture, worldviews, 
and educational demands in a free society. It does justice to societal pluralism. “Choice is 
an expression of autonomy”. 
 
Religious bodies play a large part in public life, especially through schools, and beyond 
the inner circle. Justice Sachs put it as follows in the Judgment of the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa in the case of “Christian Education South Africa versus the Minister of 
Education (August 14th 2000)”: “Such religious bodies are part of the fabric of public 
life, and constitute active elements of the diverse and pluralistic nation. Religion is not 
just a question of belief or doctrine. It is part of a way of life, of a people’s temper and 
culture, and has the capacity to awake concepts of human dignity and self-worth which 
form the cornerstone of human rights.” 
 
And he concludes that “such pluralism enjoys the right to be different; language, culture 
and religion constitute a strong weave in civil society.” A less forceful reference to the 
role of identity-related institutions is found in the draft Constitution for Europe. It 
formally recognises “… the specific and positive contribution from churches and non-







So we may conclude that educational pluralism and school choice foster not only human 
dignity but freedom itself, especially when we are concerned with the transmission of 
values. Recent research has shown, that the majority of parents consider the transmission 
of values, moral development and character formation the most crucial objectives of the 
education process. 
 
It would therefore appear that freedom of education is not a matter simply of allowing or 
supporting alternatives to State schools; it also extends to the functioning of state schools 
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